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Global health partnerships created to encourage funding efficiencies need to be approached with some caution,
with claims for innovation and responsiveness to development needs based on untested assumptions around the
potential of some partners to adapt their application, funding and evaluation procedures within these new
structures. We examine this in the case of the Health Systems Funding Platform, which despite being set up some
three years earlier, has stalled at the point of implementation of its key elements of collaboration. While much of
the attention has been centred on the suspension of the Global Fund’s Round 11, and what this might mean for
health systems strengthening and the Platform more broadly, we argue that inadequate scrutiny has been made of
the World Bank’s contribution to this partnership, which might have been reasonably anticipated based on an
historical analysis of development perspectives. Given the tensions being created by the apparent vulnerability of
the health systems strengthening agenda, and the increasing rhetoric around the need for greater harmonization in
development assistance, an examination of the positioning of the World Bank in this context is vital.
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Limited progress to date on the achievement of the
health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
has led to the realization that selective approaches to
health and development have been both ineffective and
problematic [1-4]. This realization has driven the renewal
of the health systems strengthening (HSS) concept, which
is now prominent in the wider aid effectiveness agenda
[1,5-8]. Indicative of its ascendency is the level of re-
sources and promotion it is now afforded - particularly by
a number of high profile and well-resourced multilateral
development agencies. These include the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), the
GAVI Alliance (GAVI), and the World Bank (the Bank),
which have all stepped up their HSS funding in recent
years [8], as well as amplified their advocacy for its import-
ance in achieving sustainable population health outcomes
and poverty reduction [5-7].* Correspondence: scottbrown@mail.org
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orA product of this increased focus has been the recent
formation of the Health Systems Funding Platform (Plat-
form); a funding collaboration between the Global Fund,
GAVI and the World Bank, facilitated by the World Health
Organization (WHO). The Platform was established in
2009 on the recommendation of the High Level Taskforce
on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems
(TIIFHS), and is intended to act as a mechanism to accel-
erate progress towards the MDGs. Specifically, it aims to:
“. . . coordinate, mobilize, streamline and channel the flow
of new and existing international resources to support
[HSS through] national health strategies” [9].
To improve efficiency – and to subsequently enhance
aid effectiveness - GAVI and the Global Fund trialled a
common application form for new funding, with a view
to developing a similar process for countries seeking
funding through a Joint Assessment of National Strat-
egies (JANS). In addition, all three partners propose to
harmonize their monitoring and evaluation practices
where a common reporting system and set of indicators
can be agreed between Platform partners and recipient
country [9].Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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The expansion into HSS is relatively new for GAVI and
the Global Fund; an extension of their rounds of
targeted interventions delivered in the space of immu-
nization and the three diseases respectively. The im-
petus behind their move appears to be the growing
recognition that early gains achieved under their spe-
cific mandates cannot be extended without overcoming
broader health system obstacles [2,5-7,10,11]. Another
view is that all three agencies perhaps recognise the need to
better align themselves with changing donor priorities,
where HSS may be seen as the way forward [10,11]. Irre-
spective of the motivation behind their move, this “mandate
to mingle” has caused concern and anxiety among some
development stakeholders – perhaps none more so than
civil society organizations [12,13].
The cause for concern is well understood: neither GAVI
nor the Global Fund has the necessary HSS technical ex-
pertise or the in-country presence to effectively monitor
and assist countries in HSS policy development and im-
plementation [13,14]. This means that, by default, the
World Bank – which has a self-proclaimed comparative
advantage in this space [7] – is best positioned to oversee
and lead on the Platform’s in-country policy role [15].
The Bank’s leadership in this regard – whether implicit
or explicit – should be relatively inconsequential, as
agreement between Platform partners to employ the
Paris Declaration and International Health Partnership
Plus (IHP+) aid effectiveness principles should provide
consistency and predictability around the Platform’s ap-
proach [9]. It should also assure donors that their invest-
ments are being used efficiently and effectively – in line
with agreed development principles.
We would argue however that any sense of assurance
granted by the Platform’s aid effectiveness rhetoric
should be accepted with some caution, particularly if
one subscribes to the idea that ‘past behaviour is often
the best predictor of future behaviour’. The interruption
to new HSS activities with the Global Fund’s suspension
of Round 11 is very pertinent in this regard, demonstrat-
ing the ease with which it can contain HSS support in
favour of its selective three diseases mandate. But while
current attention may be focused on the Global Fund,
this paper aims to contribute to the rather thin critique
of the World Bank’s involvement in the Health Systems
Funding Platform. Specifically, it examines the Bank’s in-
ability to comply with the aid effectiveness principles
adopted by the Platform to support its claim on innova-
tive HSS funding. In addition, it illustrates the Bank’s ap-
parent reluctance to harmonize its funding processes
with other Platform partners, casting further doubt over
the Platform’s ability to fulfil its mandate. The intention
is to stimulate greater discussion around the appropri-
ateness and merit of having the World Bank play suchan influential, and more specifically a leadership, role in
the Platform. Closer scrutiny and open debate is essential
if effective, timely and sustained outcomes are to result
from the global health community’s increased commit-
ment to HSS [16].
Methods
This research uses a case-study design [17] to examine
the practices and impact of World Bank development
policy intervention in borrower countries over almost
two decades. It also examines the available literature on
the Health Systems Funding Platform to identify impli-
cations between the World Bank’s activity and the Plat-
form’s mandate. Sources published from 1993 were
included in order to inform the historical analysis that
supports much of this essay’s argument.
To enhance its rigor and validity [18], the research de-
sign uses two qualitative research methods. The first is a
review of the available literature, drawing on peer
reviewed papers, data sets and grey literature [19]. These
were sourced using Google Scholar and Medline search
engines between 8 February 2011 and 28 January 2013.
Keywords and titles relating to ‘World Bank’ – coupled
with ‘health’, ‘development’, ‘conditionality’, ‘policy’; and
‘Health Systems Funding Platform’; ‘aid effectiveness’;
and ‘health systems strengthening’, were used to generate
results. Organizational websites including: The World
Bank, the Global Fund, the GAVI Alliance, the World
Health Organization, the OECD, and the IHP+ were also
used to source information as late as 11 March 2012.
Secondly, participant observation by the authors and
their colleagues in processes related to the Platform and
to the World Bank were drawn on (analysis and evalu-
ation of funding proposals, membership of relevant
boards, advisory groups and committees, related re-
search) [20] between 2010 and 2012. Thematic analysis
was conducted manually by the lead author. Differences
were discussed and agreement was reached between all
authors on the final analysis structure.
Discussion
A “wind of change” at the bank
Prior to its engagement in the Platform, the World Bank
clearly demonstrates a rhetorical preference for a more
comprehensive, ‘country-owned’ approach to health sec-
tor investment. This symbolic change can be traced back
most notably to its 1993 ‘World Development Report:
Investing in Health’, where its discourse clearly takes on
a sentiment of HSS through capacity building and part-
nership: “The efficiency for which aid for health is spent
depends critically on building local capacity to plan and
manage health systems” [21].
The Bank attempted, to some degree, to implement its
new ideology; evident in the rollout of its Sector Investment
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proach (SWAp) [23]. The principles promoted under
both SIPs and SWAps were of government “ownership”
and “partnership”, which complemented the argument
for a more comprehensive development strategy, and of
building local capacity as a means of achieving sustain-
able development outcomes. Through SWAps, the Bank
described its evolving directional change as “. . .an ap-
proach to locally-owned programs for a coherent sector
in a comprehensive and coordinated manner, [with an
emphasis on] moving towards the use of country sys-
tems” [23].
It was the perception of past development failures that
helped steer the Bank’s approach towards this new para-
digm. From the days of ‘structural adjustment’, “domin-
ant lessons” were learnt by the Bank through its own
research on aid effectiveness, in which it conceded that
“. . .donors can advise on and support, but cannot buy
or induce, economic [and state] reforms. Thus govern-
ment willingness to reform – where possible, with broad
popular support – is essential to popular programs” [24].
The Bank also learnt that “Empirical studies emphasize
that policy changes are driven primarily by the domestic
political economy, not by foreign assistance or policy-
based lending” [24]. Embracing the country ownership/
partnership paradigm was clearly regarded by the Bank
as the necessary alternative to the hierarchical means
synonymous with its policy-based lending and condi-
tionality approach [25-33].
The proclaimed adoption of this philosophical shift
was made particularly explicit through a series of decla-
rations announcing a “wind of change” in the Bank’s de-
velopment practices. Former World Bank President,
James Wolfensohn, summed up this directional change
in 1999 stating that:
What is new is an attempt to view our efforts within
a long-term, holistic and strategic approach. . . Such
development should, in our judgement, be a
participatory process, as transparent and as
accountable as possible within the political climate
prevailing in each country. . . It is a holistic and
strategic approach to development based on country
ownership and partnership. . . It is also a
commitment to expand partnerships, transparency,
and accountability under the leadership of
government [34].
Following a clear espousal of aid effectiveness princi-
ples through the 1990s, the Bank continues to promote
these through formal policy positions and advocacy [35].
Despite the apparent adoption of a new approach how-
ever, discrepancies between its rhetoric and its actual
practices have become evident.Implementing the aid effectiveness principles: rhetoric ≠
reality
The Bank’s track record for genuinely implementing
country ‘owned’ and ‘locally-driven’ development pol-
icies, to date, is rather poor [25-32,36-44]. Conversely,
its reputation for ‘strong-arming’ recipient governments
into state and economic reform through coercive, hier-
archical governance has become notorious with its
policy-based lending/conditionality approach. This de-
velopment strategy has been dominant at the Bank since
the days of “structural adjustment” (early 1980s), with
evidence suggesting that it remains so long after [45-48].
Research conducted by the World Bank during its
“Conditionality Review” (2006) demonstrated the opin-
ion of developing country governments regarding the
Bank adequately respecting country ownership. Of those
interviewed:
 Almost half – 49% - agreed that “World Bank
supported policy programs introduce new elements
that are not part of my country’s medium and long
term development strategy”
 More than half – 56% - thought that “my
government’s original policy program was
significantly modified in negotiations with the
World Bank”
 Three quarters – 77% - agreed that “World Bank
multi-sector operations significantly increase the
number of policy actions my country must deliver to
obtain financial support” [32].
These sentiments were also reflected in the research
conducted by Eurodad, which found evidence of the
Bank actually increasing the number of policy-based
lending conditions on borrowing countries between
2002 and 2005 [45] - as opposed to decreasing them as
it had claimed [46]. Eurodad examined the World Bank
loan documents of 20 low-income borrower countries,
and found that of these, 14 of them had more than 50
conditions attached to each of their loans, and 3 out of
20 had more than 100 conditions attached [45,47,48].
This saw the average number of conditions per loan
amongst these 20 countries rise from 48 in 2002 to 67 in
2005 [45] – six years after the Bank openly acknowl-
edges the failure of conditionality [34].
The foreign policy influence evident here has also been
found in Pakistan, where Bank officials conceded that
the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) matrix –
a document prepared by the World Bank, not the devel-
oping country government – is effectively the document
that spells out how Pakistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP) will be rolled out [32]. Similarly in
Afghanistan, Roberts (2009) describes the control the
Bank-IMF had over its PRSP, seriously questioning how
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“shape[d]” by the Bank-IMF into what it requires for ap-
proval [43].
Tuozzo (2004) also describes the coercive influence that
the World Bank’s policy intervention has had in Argentina,
finding that “Bank policy research is a discursive or idea-
tional form of power that helps to set and sustain develop-
ment agendas, some of which might not be the most
adequate or beneficial to a borrowing country” [29].
Moreover, more than 600 tribunal attendees at the
Independent People’s Tribunal in India heard hundreds
of testimonies and formal depositions from World Bank-
project affected stakeholders from across the country. “Al-
most all the testimonies overwhelmingly pointed to the
Bank’s undue (and often negative) influence in shaping
India’s national policies”, and that ‘the negative impact of
the Bank’s policy and project interventions were apparent
in every major sector of the economy and society’ [49].
Despite evidence demonstrating almost two decades of
undue policy influence, the World Bank continues to ad-
vocate for country-owned and aligned development ap-
proaches, giving it high priority in its 2007 Health,
Nutrition and Population (HNP) Strategy: “Country-
driven and country-owned programs are the key to good
HNP results on the ground”, ‘and the challenges that
need to be faced in regard to development assistance for
health (DAH) include’ “. . .the need to align and harmo-
nize global partners’ activities with country needs to pre-
vent duplication, economic distortions – and excessive
administrative costs – ensuring country-owned and
country-led DAH” [7].
This rhetoric clearly remains prominent at the Bank
today; being used currently to describe the Platform’s
guiding framework for HSS activities: the Platform “. . .is
based on the principles of the International Health Part-
nership Plus (IHP+), in line with the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness, to promote: national ownership;
alignment with national systems; harmonization between
agencies; managing for results; and mutual accountabil-
ity among partners, donors and countries” [9].
With such evident discrepancies occurring between the
Bank’s aid effectiveness rhetoric and its actual practices –
and given the length of time over which they have been
occurring, questions must be asked about the merit and
appropriateness of having the Bank play such an influen-
tial role in the Platform’s in-country HSS activities.
Non-compliance with aid effectiveness principles: a
practical necessity?
While the trend in coercion and undue influence by the
Bank has been well documented over time [25-32,36-44],
the dichotomy between its behaviour and its policy rhet-
oric, and the potential reasoning behind it, have been ex-
plored less thoroughly.Turning briefly to the latter, it is understood that in some
instances, developing country governments are perceived
by donors as having weak capacity, inadequate accountabil-
ity and compromised integrity [50-54]. ‘Coordination led
by recipient country governments can often be traced to
weaknesses in policy and planning processes, and inad-
equacies in the institutional arrangements established to
coordinate aid’ [50].
Giri et. al.’s (2013) recent study into the Government of
Nepal’s aid coordinating capabilities highlights this issue:
Despite its commitment to coordinate and control
development assistance to the health sector, and its
leadership position of the Sector Wide Approach,
complete knowledge and effective coordination of all
international contributions remains a challenge and is
hampered by issues within the government as well as
among External Development Partners and
International Non-Governmental Organizations [55].
Conveying the familiar result of perceived recipient
government weaknesses, a Swedish evaluation of its aid
to Bangladesh, including the World Bank/cofinancier
FPHP, found that: ‘. . .it is rather self-evident that the
government’s coordinating role falls victim to interests
of efficiency. The nature of the programs as gigantic by-
pass operations, set to avoid the negative influence of
the bureaucracy, tends to be perpetuated’ [50,56].
In addition to interests of efficiency, donors will often
bypass government systems in an attempt to avoid or min-
imise potential corruption and misappropriation [51-54].
Haiti, with its influx of development and humanitarian aid
in recent years, provides an example of where concerns
over both government capability and corruption have had
this effect [57]. The assertion by some that billions of dol-
lars in aid – a proportion of which has been channelled
through government infrastructure - has done little to im-
prove the lives of Haitians, or to enhance the country’s
governance and institutional capacity, somewhat supports
donor decisions to explore alternatives to government-led
aid coordination [57].
The politics of aid coordination
As well as matters of capability and integrity, the grow-
ing political connotations associated with foreign aid
(since 2001 in particular) appear to also shape a donor’s
decision to use or bypass recipient government systems:
Stakeholders are well aware of the power, influence
and leverage which aid coordination confers, an
awareness which colours the desire of some
stakeholders to lead aid coordination processes, and
conditions the extent and manner by which others
wish to be involved [50].
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through the Egyptian and Pakistani governments, for ex-
ample – both of which have been plagued for years by
proclamations of corruption and financial mismanage-
ment [58,59], illustrates one instance of this. The US has
seemingly chosen to trade-off matters of efficiency and
effectiveness for the advancement of a number of its for-
eign policy objectives (largely regional stability and sup-
port for the ‘war on terror’) [60].
The assertion that US foreign policy objectives colours
the extent to which the US applies its development aid
control measures has considerable implications for the
World Bank and its clients. It has been well argued that
the US often has disproportionate influence over the
World Bank’s fund disbursement and conditionality deci-
sions [61-63]. Kilby (2009) finds specifically that countries
that are ‘not friendly’ to the US (those that do not make
concessions to the US position in important UN votes, for
example) have their World Bank loan conditions more
strictly enforced than those that are favourable to US posi-
tions [63]. This notion provides further consideration to
why the World Bank may exert – or conversely relax –
control over aid coordination in recipient countries.
Donor control for effectiveness: a paradox
Irrespective of the motive behind a donor’s decision to
control aid, or to exert undue influence over a country’s
development policies, ample evidence demonstrates its
categorical ineffectiveness [64]. Thus using it for greater
effectiveness is both paradoxical and problematic.
Acknowledgement of this very notion is what has
helped drive the advocacy for aid effectiveness principles
by the World Bank (and GAVI and the Global Fund for
that matter), and hence why they have used this philoso-
phy to drive the Platform’s claim on innovative HSS
funding.
However, as this paper has demonstrated throughout,
despite promoting one development philosophy, the
World Bank in reality does something quite different. Its
willingness to disregard aid effectiveness principles in
favour of its hierarchical ‘business as usual’ approach to
development, poses some real concerns for the Platform.
Most importantly, it raises serious questions around its
appositeness for the task.
Partnership tensions
As well as failing to genuinely comply with the aid effect-
iveness principles adopted by the Platform, tensions be-
tween the Bank and other Platform partners are becoming
apparent. The World Bank convened Independent Evalu-
ation Group (2006) highlights this issue, finding that:
GRPPs [Global and Regional Partnership Programs]
with shared governance arrangements present anumber of challenges for the Bank’s traditional
country-based business model. First, they challenge
the Bank’s traditional financial and managerial
accountability mechanisms. Their legal and
governance arrangements do not always confer
sufficient clarity on how the collective responsibility
for the programs works in practice and may set limits
on the Bank’s authority that are not consistent with its
accountability [65].
The Bank’s reluctance to harmonize its HSS applica-
tion and funding processes with those of its Platform
partners is seemingly indicative of these issues [11].
Adding to the structural difficulties are the relationship
tensions becoming evident between Bank and Global Fund
operational staff:
Both Global Fund and Bank operational staff would
prefer engagement in the context of their own
organization’s business model. They generally viewed
the comparative advantages of the other organization
in terms of what the other could contribute to its own
method of operation [66].
Partnership impediments are reinforced by the fact
that there is no formal agreement or memorandum of
understanding between the Bank and the Global Fund in
terms of working together at country level - nor have
there been any written directives or guidelines issued to
staff in either organization to support this [66].
These impediments, combined with the Bank’s inabil-
ity to implement the aid effectiveness principles that it
so openly adopts, cast shadows over the Platform’s abil-
ity to deliver effectively on its HSS mandate. Notwith-
standing, this partnership still reflects a paradigmatic
shift in the way multilateral agencies harmonize prac-
tices in a bid for better aid coordination, and its concept
should be welcomed and promoted. But unless due cau-
tion and much needed debate is afforded to the evident
discrepancies between the Bank’s rhetoric and its prac-
tice, and unless it is able to better cooperate with its
partners at country-level, the Platform and all that it in-
tends to achieve risks resulting in another development
intervention failure.
Summary
While international attention is currently focussed on
the Global Fund’s Round 11 suspension, and what this
might mean for HSS activity, little critique has been of-
fered of the World Bank’s ambivalence around ‘country-
ownership’ and ‘partnership’ and its limited procedural
flexibility within the Platform.
Despite recognition of its failure to achieve adequate
health and development outcomes using its traditional
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subsequent rhetorical adoption of the Paris Declaration
and IHP+ principles [7], evidence demonstrates that
hierarchical governance persists as the dominant devel-
opment practice at the Bank [25-33,43,44].
Reasons for this occurrence can, in many instances, be
understood (even if not agreed with) [50-54]. However, this
does not displace the fact that building a partnership –
with such sizeable resources and expectations – on a plat-
form of principles which are not complied with by, argu-
ably, its most important member, poses a serious risk to
the integrity of the partnership, and more importantly, to
the outcomes it promises to deliver. The lack of critique
to date on the World Bank’s role is perhaps indicative of a
more systemic issue; that insufficient consideration is be-
ing given to partnerships created for political and bureau-
cratic convenience. This paper calls to redress this issue,
and argues for a critical approach to global health partner-
ships through increased discussion and debate, before too
many resources and a growing level of expectation result
in another development intervention becoming a costly
and ineffective burden.
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